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POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES
AS GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
.... with the accent on Communism
W. DEAN WAGNER*
The manifold impact of Communism on our society has
created variant problems for the judiciary. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the issue of "communism as grounds for
divorce" has been raised occasionally in divorce litigation.
The recent case of Donaldson v. Donaldson1 dealt directly
with this question. This was an action by the wife against
the husband for a divorce. The defendant answered with
a cross complaint requesting that he be awarded the divorce
and custody of a minor child. The plaintiff's complaint was
dismissed and the counter claim allowed. The Supreme
Court held that the fact the wife was a member of the com-
munist party at the time of her marriage and refused to
continue in the religious beliefs of her birth did not entitle
the husband to a divorce. The decree was reversed and re-
manded. The court said:
"Neither a religious belief (or the lack of such be-
lief) nor a political or social opinion is of itself
grounds for divorce in this jurisdiction."
In arriving at this conclusion the court pointed out that
the only provision of the statute under which the counter
complaint might possibly lie was that which provided "Cruel
treatment of either party by the other, or personal indig-
nities rendering life burdensome' 2 are grounds for divorce.
Thus, the court was of the opinion that divergent political
opinions, per se, do not constitute the essential elements of
either (1) cruel treatment, or (2) personal indignities.3
* 2nd year law student, Duke University; A.B. Colgate, 1950.
231 P.2d 607 (Wash. 1951). See case note, 14 GA. B. J. 238 (Nov.
1951).
2 LAws OF WASH., 1949, c. 215, §2, p. 698, REM.Supp. 1949 §997-2.
3 Cf. New York Herald Tribune, March 8, 1952, p. 1. "A court in
Potsdam, East Germany, has ruled a man may divorce his wife for not
being sufficiently Marxist, even though he may have admitted adultery.
. .. The wife's 'politically weak conduct' drove him to turn away from
her, it said."
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Certain questions immediately arise from an opinion of
this sort. Is the basis of the court's opinion the judicial
determination that the essential elements of what consti-
tutes cruel treatment do not encompass the incompatibility
that results because of political disparity, so that other
courts with different opinions might arrive at a different
conclusion? Do the divorce statutes conceive of political
differences as grounds for divorce? If they do, are there
any policy factors that would preclude their inclusion into
divorce regulation?
The law is scant with opinions where the issue of political
differences have been raised in divorce proceedings. Besides
the Donaldson case, one other case raised the subject of po-
litical differences as grounds for divorce. That was Braun
v. Brauni4 and likewise was decided in the state of Washing-
ton. The court held:
"The trial court apparently and properly disre-
garded the charges that the appellant was a com-
munist, which certainly would not constitute cruel-
ty per se and be grounds for divorce." 5
The decisions in these two cases seem to be correct by the
application of the process of applying rules developed in
analogous situations. It is surprising, considering the
frenzy with which some hold political convictions, that the
question has not been raised previously, and in more detail.
Reasonable research indicates that these two cases consist
of the "law" on this aspect of the topic. But, there has de-
veloped in our law the principle that religious differences
between spouses are not, per se, grounds for divorce. And
the close analogy between political differences and re-
ligious differences can clearly be seen. The desire for a
divorce would stem from incompatibility due to a state of
mind of one of the spouses which the other finds impossible
to bear. There seems to be no perceptible difference between
the basis for divorce on the grounds of one's religious be-
liefs and because of one's political convictions.
1 31 Wash.2d 468, 197 P.2d 442, 443 (1948).
r It is not clear from this case to what extent the issue of communism
was pressed on the court. This appears to be a minor point in the de.
cision. But the language is clear and seems to be more than dictum.
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As a general proposition, divorce may be granted for
three distinct reasons. The first because of fault between
parties. An example would be the ephemeral concept
mental cruelty."0 The second ground would be misfortune.
E.g., impotency.7 And thirdly, some states allow for sepa-
ration on the basis of agreement between parties." As has
previously been pointed out, the Washington court was of
the opinion that the only relevant part of the statute under
which political differences could be treated as possible
grounds for divorce was that relating to mental cruelty.
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that any basis for
allowing divorce because of religious or political differences
would be on the grounds of mental cruelty, or a corollary
thereof. Thus, in considering the total question, it is im-
portant to keep constantly in mind the statutory provisions
and the scope accorded them by the judiciary, particularly
to mental cruelty.
Since the Donaldson case held that political differences
do not constitute the requisite grounds for divorce, it would
be wise to inquire to what extent the courts have held that
religious differences were sufficient grounds; and if they
are grounds, what restrictions or limitations have been
placed thereon. The dictum in Haymond v. HaymondO con-
stitutes a good beginning.
"In view of the constitutional provision securing
to 'all men the right to worship almighty God ac-
cording to the dictates of their own conscience' and
asserting that no human authority ought in any
case whatever to control or interfere with the
rights of conscience in matters of religion, we do
not think that questions as to the doctrines or prac-
tices of the Sanctificationists ought to have been
permitted to enter to any extent into the trial ...
If her conduct as a wife was such as to furnish her
husband grounds for divorce, the acts themselves
would be the only proper subjects of investigation,
without any regard to the religious convictions that
led to them." (Emphasis added)
See 27 C.3.S., Divorce, §24, et seq., p. 543.
See 27 C.S.S., Divorce, §19, p. 540.
See 27 C.3.S., Divorce, §42, p. 581.
' Haymond v. Haymond, 74 Tex. 414, 12 S.W. 90 (1889).
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The broad doctrine announced in this case (though not
original thereto) seems to set the pattern for the courts' ap-
plication of religious differences as grounds for divorce.
Smith v. Smith'0 serves as an illustration. Here the wife be-
came a member of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses,
and zealously carried out her faith to the extent of disrupting
and destroying the family life. Such actions were held to
constitute cruel treatment towards the husband, and the
court affirmed a judgment granting a divorce to the hus-
band with custody of the two minor children. The actions
of the wife amounted to cruelty, and the naked facts of re-
ligious incompatibility was not the moving cause for the
divorce." Comparable is Johnson v. Johnson, 2 where the
wife had become a "Seventh Day Adventist" and also joined
a sect known as the "Holiness People." As a result of her
new found beliefs, she refused to have sexual intercourse
with her husband until she received word from God that the
husband likewise had become converted.' 3  She also neg-
lected the household duties, disrupted the family schedule,
and was no longer the efficient housewife and mother she
had been before; and that it appears all these consequences
directly resulted from her active participation and belief in
her religion. A divorce was not granted, even under a
statute where grounds for divorce was "indignities to his
person . . . rendering life . . . burdensome."' 4 In Krauss
v. Krauss15 the husband, a Jew, became converted to Chris-
tianity. He devoted himself entirely to the new faith with
zest, to the extent that he allowed his business to deterio-
rate, and stayed away from home at long periods of time
10 61 Ariz. 373, 149 P.2d 683 (1944).
u The apropos part of the divorce statute under which the case was
considered set out as grounds for divorce, "Where the husband or the
wife is guilty of excesses, cruel treatment or outrages towards the other
whether by the use of personal violence or other means." §27-802, Axiz.
CODE AnN., 1939.
U 31 Pa.Super.Ct. 53 (1906).
1 See also Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 577
(1909). The refusal to have marital relations due to the wife's member-
ship in an organization of which the members were deemed "wedded to
Christ" was not grounds for desertion.
24 Act of Pa. Assembly, June 25, 1895, P.L. 308.
163 La. 218, 111 So. 683 (1927). See annotation, 58 A.L.R. 457.
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studying in various schools. Because of these activities
his family was forced to a lower social station in life and
compelled to live in less comfortable surroundings. The
court said:
"If the plaintiff's evidence went no further than to
show religious differences, that would end the case.
The law has not designated and indeed could make
diverse religious opinions a legal cause for separa-
tion. The fundamental law of the land guarantees
freedom of religion and the right to worship ac-
cording to the dictates of one's own conscience."
But the decree was granted because of the conditions aris-
ing from the religious differences. 16
A divorce was granted where the wife, believing it to be
her duty, insisted on being a Christian Science "Healer" ;17
where the wife was a Protestant and her husband criticised
the church to which she belonged ;18 where the husband was
a Roman Catholic and the wife was a Protestant and the
two could not get along together ;19 and where the husband
was profane to the wife who was a devout churchgoer.20
A divorce was not granted where one spouse refused to
conform to an antenuptial agreement as to the rearing of
the children in the Catholic church, 21 and where the hus-
band was a Methodist and the wife a Roman Catholic and
they quarreled about his insistence on singing in the choir,
among other things.22
10 Ibid, 111 So. at 685. "The court will look . . . to the nature and
character of the treatment itself in determining the question as to
whether it amounts to such cruelties to warrant a separation."
17 Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H. 600, 23 Atl. 362, 15 L.R.A. 121, 49
Am.St.Rep. 632 (1891).
is DeCloedt v. DeCloedt, 24 Idaho 277, 133 Pac. 664 (1913).
1 Edmonds v. Edmonds, 193 Iowa 87, 185 N.W. 2 (1921).
20 Payne v. Payne, 4 Humph. 500 (Tenn. 1844).
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926). See, Carty, The
Enforceabilitv of Antenuptial Agreements for the Religious Instruction
of Children, 2 DUKE B.J. 70 (Dec. 1951).
- Meffert v. Meffert, 118 Ark. 582, 177 S.W. 1 (1915); see, also, Law-
rence v. Lawrence, 3 Paige 267 (N.Y. 1832). The master properly ex-
cluded evidence that the sole difficulty was the refusal of the husband
to allow the wife to attend the Presbyterian church. See also, Hill v.
Hill, 203 Ky. 182, 261 S.W. 1115 (1924).
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It must be strongly emphasized, however, that in the
cases where a divorce was granted, the reason was not the
religious differences, per se, but because of the resultant
difficulties that sprung from such differences. No court
has said that a complaint based on the religious differences
alone between spouses constitutes adequate grounds for a
divorce decree. Each court has, more or less, said the facts
of each case must stand on their separate footing and whe-
ther or not mental cruelty resulted depends upon the extent
and nature of the facts alleged to have constituted the
cruelty. The test seems to be:
"Whether or not mental suffering constitutes men-
tal cruelty depends upon the sound sense of justice
of the trial court, and in each case, it is a question
of fact to be deduced from the circumstances.
''23
And religious differences, per se, do not constitute the
requisite mental suffering.
Nor is this conclusion altered by a New Jersey decision
which denied to a mother custody of two minor children
after a divorce decree was granted.24 It was held that a
belief in atheistic communistic doctrines renders a parent
unfit to receive custody of her child. 25 It does not appear
that the moving cause for the divorce was the "atheistic
communistic" doctrines or that the court considered the
religious and political disparity as the focal point for the
divorce. The issue of political and religious beliefs arose
to determine the character of the mother in determining
her claim of custody.
From the survey of the cases two conclusions can be pos-
tulated:
1. Neither religious nor political differences of
themselves between spouses constitute grounds
for divorce under the interpretations given the
mental cruelty provisions of the statutes.
2. Difficulties flowing from such differences may
be grounds for divorce if in themselves such dif-
2 Ungemach v. Ungemach, 61 Cal.App.2d 29, 142 P.2d 99 (1943).
M Eaton v. Eaton, 122 N.J.Eq. 142, 191 At. 839 (1936).
See note, 49 HMv. L. REv. 831, where Eaton v. Eaton, supra note 24,
Is criticized.
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
ficulties constitute mental cruelty, aside from
their political or religious relationship.
While the Donaldson and Braun cases (the only two con-
sidering political differences) did not refer to the appar-
ently strong analogy in the series of religious difference
cases, the analogy is implicit in the decisions. The Wash-
ington court had asserted in an earlier case that the test
for determining whether religious fanaticism constitutes
cruel treatment is this: Did the belief cause a disruption or
destruction of family life -?26 Thus, the Washington court
adopted the unanimous view by requiring something more
than religious differences per se. The decisions in the com-
munism cases followed quite naturally and logically.
Whether the reluctance stems from a feeling that reli-
gious and political differences by their very nature should
not constitute grounds for divorce, that the liberality of
divorce has reached its outermost limits, that there may be
some constitutional objections to divorces on these bases,
the courts still maintain the position that an allega-
tion of religious or political differences in a complaint is
mere surplusage and is not to become an issue before the
court.
Statutes
Reasonable arguments may be given for extend-
ing divorce on the basis of religious or political differences
between spouses. But any such extension must necessarily
fall within the confines of the divorce provisions of the
statutes. Recall that the Washington court refused a di-
vorce decree because of political differences as either (1)
cruel treatment, or (2) personal indignities. Most divorce
statutes are set out in general terms, thus it is incumbent
upon the judiciary to give them explicit meaning. Political
or religious differences as grounds for divorce could only
fall into that category generally stated as "mental cruelty."
Practically all American jurisdictions today recognize some
kind of cruelty as grounds for divorce.27 Extreme cruelty
" Mertens v. Mertens, 227 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1951).
-7 2 VERNIER, AmEBIcAN I .y LAWs, § 66, pp. 24-29 (1931). VERNIER,
AmueAc FimiLY LAws, § 66, p. 40 (Supplement 1948).
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is recognized in fifteen jurisdictions, 28 cruel and inhuman
treatment in six jurisdictions, 29 mental cruelty in nine
states,80 and cruelty by the use of physical violence or other
means in two states.3 ' There are ten jurisdictions that
proscribe the standard of indignities as grounds for di-
vorce.8 2 It is thus impossible to determine any definite
standard from the plain wordings of the statute because
they are couched in summary and ambiguous language,
which leaves much room for judicial interpolation. For ex-
ample, while Nevada provides for a standard of "extreme
cruelty,"8 3 the divorce rate there is unquestionably high, due
in some respects to the liberality of interpretion.8 4
Furthermore, the earlier belief that physical violence had
to accompany the cruelty has declined as a condition prece-
dent to divorce.35 The conduct amounting to cruelty must
be "unjustifiable conduct . . . which so grievously wounds
the mental feelings of the other . . . as to seriously impair
the bodily health, or . . . such as utterly destroys the legit-
imate ends and objects of matrimony."' ' 8 This leaves, in
effect, a requirement of judicial determination of whether
conduct other than physical violence or a reasonable appre-
hension thereof is sufficient.37 It is the province of the
trial judge to look to the evidence in light of the circum-
stances and apply the law to the facts of the case. 38 Thus,
21 California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota.
29 Alaska, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, Texas, Wisconsin.
" California, Colorado, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Nebraska, Wis-
consin, Arizona, Michigan.
nArizona, Michigan.
Nxv. ComP. LAws 1929, § 9460.
' For a general summarization of mental cruelty statutes see, Ram-
sey, Mental Cruelty as Grounds for Divorce, 5 AuK. L. REV. 419 (Fall
1951).
" There is nothing In the terms of the statutes that would seem to
require violence as a condition precedent to divorce.
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712, 2 Pac. 122, 144, 46 Am.Rep.
108 (1883).
-1 See supra note 15, Krauss v. Krauss; and supra note 26, Mertens
v. Mertens.
09 Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 94 N.E. 564 (1911). "Cruel and
Inhuman ... is . . . a relative term, and of necessity must depend
upon circumstances of each particular case."
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"indifferent aversion and profane language may consti-
tute cruelty." 39
The term "indignities" while encompassing a broad
scope, have been defined rather narrowly by the courts.
"The cases emphasize a course of conduct evidencing in-
tentional and deliberate neglect, estrangement, and settled
hatred. '40  It seems that in those states using this term,
the good sense of justice and prudence of the trial courts
are relied on to give it meaning.41 The suggestion, though,
that the cases emphasize a course of conduct of an inten-
tional character narrows considerably the relief proffer-
ed.42
This note is in no sense intended to be a summarization of
mental cruelty statutes in the United States. Rather, a
brief outline of the scope of the phrase "cruelty" as used
in divorce statutes, with an emphasis on the latitude left
the courts in the application of the standards to particular
facts and circumstances. The statutes, as a whole, fail to
spell out in detail the particular facts requisite as condi-
tions for divorce. The courts are left with seemingly dis-
cretionary power to "fill in the gaps" and give the statutes
definite meaning. Therefore, it would seem possible, if cir-
cumstances warranted, to draw into the statute the fact of
political or religious affiliation with a "non-accepted" group
as a ground for divorce. The justification of this brief outline
of cruelty statutes is that if religious and political differ-
ences are to be used as a basis of divorce, it must be done
so by the osmosis process into the cruelty provisions. The
reticent factor is not the statutes, but the reluctance of
the judiciary.
1 Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wash.2d 78, 132 P.2d 734 (1943); also
Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917).
10 Ramsey, op cit. supra note 34. See Trenchard v. Trenchard, 245 Ill,
313, 92 N.E. 243 (1910).
,1 Bova v. Bova, 135 S.W.2d 384 (Mo.App. 1940). "It is impossible to
lay down any rule that will apply to all cases in determining what in-
dignities are grounds of divorce because they render the condition of the
injured party intolerable . . . . [E]ach case [is] to be determined ac-
cording to its own peculiar circumstances."
42 Ramsey, op cit. supra note 34. "These decisions do, however, re-
quire the conduct complained of to be intentional which as has been
seen is not a uniform requirement under the ordinary cruelty statutes."
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Political and Religious Differences as Cruelty
It is to be presumed that the matter of divorce is a sub-
jective matter manifested by overt acts provable in court.
Those acts which to one spouse would be cruel, reprehensi-
ble and inhuman, may be tolerable and inconsequential to
another. Thus, the subjective attitude of one of the
spouses should be the moving test as to whether or not a
divorce should be granted. Ridiculous reasons should be
given no credence in court. But when a factor of obvious
friction enters a home and make compatibility no longer
possible, the courts should listen with sympathetic ear and
grant the deserving party relief.
Consider the case of Mrs. X. She has been married to
her husband for ten years. They have gotten along reason-
ably well. Mr. X, being dissatisfied with social and political
conditions drifts into the Communist party. He becomes
an active member thereof. In no way does he lessen his
affection for his wife. He still gives her the same living
allowance and in all ways acts the same. But Mr. X's re-
cent affiliation becomes known to the community. Perhaps
he is summoned to testify before a congressional hearing
investigating labor conditions in Mr. X's community. Mrs.
X finds herself in an embarrassing situation. She feels the
Communist party constitutes a threat to our country and is
directly responsible for the Korean War. She feels she
cannot honestly live with a man who supports such foreign
and anti-American doctrine. She applies to the court for
a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty, alleging the
cause to be her husband's political affiliations. The decree
is denied!
Such a decree would be denied in every jurisdiction to-
day, if the "law" concerning political and religious differ-
ences as grounds for divorce remains unaltered. From a
reading of the decisions, one can detect two motivating
factors which cause the courts' hesitancy to allow these
elements to constitute sufficient grounds for divorce.
The first factor was spelled out in the case of Eaton
v. Eaton.48 There the fitness of the mother as custodian
13 Supra note 24.
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of the children was challenged because of her atheistic com-
munistic beliefs, and was the reasons for denying her cus-
tody of the children. On commenting to this case it was sug-
gested:
". .. [T]here would seem to be no such relation
between the parent's political creed and the child's
welfare as would justify an inquiry into the form-
er's beliefs, in view of the attendant risk of preju-
dice when the issue of Communism is raised."44
The argument, sub silentio, is that because of an overt
distaste for Communism a litigant would not get a fair
and impartial judgment before a judicial tribunal. No
doubt this would be true in some instances. But it is to
be wondered if a judge would be more antipathetical to-
wards a Communist husband than to a drunken or un-
faithful one. The trial judge's attitude of the conduct of
the defendant is not the important factor. (Indeed the
"attendant risk" of judicial prejudice is presented in most
every type of controversial litigation.) The initial factor
in a divorce trial is what the spouse seeking the divorce
thinks of the other, and whether she actually suffered men-
tal cruelty merely because of a political or religious belief.
If such is the case, and such wrong is a legal wrong, then a
divorce should be granted. It is quite possible that any trial
judge might disfavor a litigant who is a Communist. But if
that communism has in fact caused mental cruelty as to jus-
tify a severing of marital relations, the political or religious
beliefs of the jurist would be inconsequential. To argue that
Communism is a disfavored belief and thus should not be
a basis for judicial relief overlooks the very essence of the
reason for divorce provisions which seem to be grounded
in the wise public policy of allowing persons to disband a
legal relationship when intolerable circumstances become
present in the marital status. And also it indicates a strin-
gent narrow mindedness as to the ability of our courts and
jurists.
The second reason for viewing with skepticism religious
or political differences as grounds for divorce can be found
S, ura note 25.
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in the opinion of Krauss v. Krauss.45 "The fundamental
law of the land guarantees freedom of religion and the right
to worship according to the dictates of one's own con-
science." Impliedly expressed is that the right to political
freedom is also guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus,
a judicial discrimination based on a religious or political
ground would be invalid as violative of the 1st and 14th
amendments.
If a divorced Communist husband were to complain that
he was severed from his spouse because of political beliefs
and thus was denied equal protection of the laws, his argu-
ment might gain some support. He might feel himself the
subject of discrimination not visited on a Socialist, Pro-
gressive, Dixiecrat, et al. But again, such an argument
overlooks the subjective nature of a divorce proceeding. It
is not intended here to delve into constitutional ramifications
or to predict a decision involving communism. But Chief
Justice Vinson's remarks are apt:
"The fact that the statute identifies persons by
their political affiliations and beliefs, which are
circumstances ordinarily irrelevant to permissable
subjects of governmental action, does not lead to
the conclusion that such circumstances are never
relevant.46
It is submitted that every man has a constitutional right
to be a drunkard if he wants to, but this causes no hesitancy
on the part of trial courts to grant a divorce if the cir-
cumstances warrant. Divorce based on political beliefs
would in no way encroach upon the right of a man to be-
lieve or worship as he desires. He is not being punished for
his opinions or subjected to ridicule. In no respect are pun-
itive measures imposed, but he may be subjected to personal
and social sanctions. However, the former may be the case
in many divorces based on grounds wholly anterior to the
subject of discussion. It would equally be an invasion of
rights to force a person to suffer the public indignities
concomitant with having a spouse who is a Communist, and




The marital status, among other things, is a legal rela-
tionship. The legislatures in their wisdom have devised
standards which may be applied to dissolve the relation-
ship. As has been seen, such standards are ambiguous and
"mental cruelty" has come to embrace many variant cir-
cumstances. But the underlying principle would appear to
stand as ascertainable. It would mean a condition of mind
created in one spouse that makes that spouse believe it is
no longer possible to live with the other. To say that "Com-
munism" or "Sanctificationism" cannot create such an atti-
tude is an idealistic expression of judicial naivetb.47
Returning to the case of Mrs. X and assuming that she
has suffered mental anxiety, it is unfortunate that relief
cannot be had in the courts (or to get relief it will be neces-
sary to present further evidence). The barrier to divorcing
her husband would seem to be unfair, if the real purpose of
divorce statutes is to allow separation when certain condi-
tions manifest themselves in family life. To draw arbi-
trarily the line here seems to evade the overall intent and
purposes of divorce machinery. "Mental cruelty" could cover
the resultant difficulties occasioned because of religious or
political differences if the courts were inclined to be more
liberal in their interpretation of what mental cruelty really
is. It could be expected that such a liberality of interpreta-
tion, if indeed such is liberal interpretation, would result
in advantage being taken of the latitude given to grant
a divorce because of religious or political differences. But
such can be expected in most any type of regulation. It
cannot truthfully be said that no divorce has ever been
given when it was not deserved. We must anticipate only
the justice in allowing divorce when actually needed or
deserved. It would be unfair to punish those innocent par-
ties for fear of the few who might abuse the privilege, and
who might take advantage of this basis for divorce rather
than proceed within the proper limits of the law. The law
0 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391
(1950). This is not a divorce case.
,7 This, in effect, is what the courts have suggested-that the differ-
ences cannot create a condition of mind in any case that would justify
the granting of a divorce. See, Donaldson v. Donaldson, supra note 1.
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should take recognition of that actual suffering that can
occur because of diverse religious and political differences,
instead of indulging in speculation of what might happen.
Conclusion
The picture is not one of hopelessness for a married per-
son with a spouse indulging in religious or political activi-
ties repugnant to the other. From a sampling of the opin-
ions it is certain that religious or political differences, per
se, will not constitute the requisite grounds for divorce. Yet,
if a party can show that some type of collateral suffering
has coccurred, incident to the political or religious activities
that cause a disruption of the family, or cause pernicious
mischief to the family life, or lower the social life of the
other spouse, inter alia, a divorce will be granted on the
basis of mental cruelty. Therefore, if a wife can show that
her husband is a Communist, that she can not get employ-
ment because of his activities, that her friends shun her and
her relatives ignore her, and, thus, she has become a nervous
wreck, most jurisdictions would allow a divorce. The reason
for the divorce would be the resulting conditions caused by
the political or religious differences, and not the differences
in beliefs themselves. Thus the attorney for the complain-
ing spouse, before instituting proceedings, should make cer-
tain such conditions exist and the complaint so specifies.
Actually, in most instances the only time a divorce would
be desired would be when these conditions do exist. And
that it could then be had seems clear. In most instances it
would be the tangible circumstances resulting from diverse
opinions that would make one desire a divorce. But it is
when mental cruelty results as a per se consequence of polit-
ical or religious differences, not contingent on consequential
acts, that divorce relief is denied, and where possibly, we
argue, it should be offered.
But it seems sufficient to say that no complaint in any
disparity will now bring relief. The courts have been uni-
formly cold to the suggestion that such disparity constitutes
sufficient grounds for divorce. Nor is there any apparent
judicial inclination to alter this attitude.
